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Governments have often attempted to protect downstream
water infrastructure by providing short-term subsidies for the
adoption of conservation practices or low-erosion land uses.
However, these efforts have often yielded disappointing
results, with farmers either declining to adopt the
recommended practices, or only adopting them temporarily
(Pagiola 1999). The Payment for Environmental Services (PES)
approach promises to provide a more effective and more
sustainable system for inducing farmers to adopt conservation
measures (Pagiola and Platais 2007). In this paper we examine
current conservation subsidy policies in a Tunisian watershed,
and discuss how they might be modified to incorporate PES
principles so as to improve their effectiveness. 
The current subsidy system
Barbara watershed is located in a mountainous area in north-
western Tunisia. It covers about 200 km2, between 60 m and
1203 m above sea level, with high slopes. Cropland covers 39
percent of the watershed, forests 25 percent, intercropping
olive trees with cereals 14 percent and grassland three
percent. A reservoir with a potential water capacity of 59
million m3 in the lower part of the watershed supplies water
for domestic use and irrigation. The area has a high population
density (124 inhabitants/km2), most of whom are poor and
dependent on subsistence agriculture. 
Unsustainable agricultural practices such as cereal cropping
and overgrazing cause serious erosion problems in the
watershed, including landslides, river bank and bed erosion.
They are believed to cause damages both on-site, such as
reduced agricultural yields, and off-site, through decreasing
water availability due to dam siltation. An erosion and
sedimentation analysis in the watershed found that most of
the sediment which reached the reservoir originated in gullies
and adjacent areas (Sterk 2009). Accordingly, we focus only
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on these areas. Most land around gullies is privately owned
and cultivated with cereals. 
High erosion risk in the watershed prompted the Tunisian
government to promote the adoption of conservation measures
such as building stone walls or planting acacia in gullies. As can
be seen in Table 1, all of these practices are less profitable for
farmers than producing cereals alone. As a result, farmers are
unwilling to adopt them without support. The Office for Sylvo-
Pastoral Development of the North West (ODESYPANO) subsidises
about 80% of the investment cost of these measures, while
participating farmers are expected to provide the remaining
investment costs (in kind), as well as the annual maintenance
costs. With these subsidies, the attractiveness of conservation
practices to farmers increases, as shown in Table 1, but often
remain less attractive than just cereals. Thus, even with
subsidies, some farmers have resisted adopting the
recommended measures. In the case of stone walls in gullies,
they have sometimes agreed to adopt the practice but declined
to provide their in-kind labour contribution, thus effectively
increasing the subsidy to investment costs to 100%. Subsequent
Table 1. Net returns from alternative land uses1 in Barbara watershed (TND/ha)
Land uses1 Farmer’s perspective2 National perspective3
Without subsidy With subsidy
1. Cereals with no conservation measure in gullies 815 n.a. -55
2. Cereals with stone walls in gullies -330 720 -430
3. Cereals with stone walls and acacia in gullies -450 710 -380
4. Cereals with acacia in gullies 715 835 160
Africa
1 In the land uses considered (1-4), cereals are located on private lands adjacent to gullies, and the conservation measures (stone walls, acacia, stone walls and acacia) are in gullies,
on collective lands. The unit of analysis for each land use includes 1 ha of cereals and 0.1 ha of adjacent gully, which makes possible the comparison among the four land uses. The
results reflect net present value over 20 years expressed in constant 2007 prices. 1 Tunisian Dinar (TND) = US $0.78.
2 From the farmer's perspectives, we consider the following costs and benefits for the land uses: 1) annual cost and benefit from cereals near gullies and annual benefit from grazing
in gullies; 2) investment cost of stone walls, annual cost and benefit from cereals near gullies; 3) investment costs of stone walls and acacia plantation, annual cost and benefit of
cereals; 4) investment and maintainance costs of acacia plantation in gullies, annual cost and benefit of cereals near gullies. Costs and benefits are estimated at financial prices and
discounted at 10%.
3 The analysis from the national perspective includes the costs and benefits considered from the farmer's perspective and the cost of sedimentation occuring from each land use. The
cost of sedimentation was estimated by applying the Morgan Morgan Finney (MMF) method at land use level, and Pacific Southwest Inter-Agency Committee (PSIAC) and Factorial Scoring
Model (FSM) at watershed level (for more details, see World Bank 2009). The costs and benefits are estimated at economic prices and discounted at 10%. The economic prices are
obtained by eliminatingthe distortions from the financial prices (eg. taxes and subsidies).
The Barbara Reservoir. Photo: G. Sterk.
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maintenance is minimal, reducing the useful life of the walls
from an expected 15 years to eight or less. 
In case of acacia in gullies, survival rates are quite low, at about
40%. As gullies are collective lands, the direct use benefits of
trees go to the community, thus farmers have no incentive to
undertake any maintenance (e.g. fencing). If supporting the cost
of protection from others’ grazing made this land use attractive
to farmers (compared to cereals alone) they would most likely
maintain the acacia. Thus, the net returns in Table 1 capture, in
addition to the investment itself, also the cost of guarding the
acacia plantation from community grazing.
Use of payments for environmental services
The current support programme to planting acacia in gullies
could be considered an effort of the government to generate
environmental services. However, though driven by the
objective of soil and water conservation, this programme does
not have some important characteristics of a conventional PES
scheme. As it brings only a partial contribution to investment
costs, it is not conditional, and does not compensate for
expenses and forgone earnings after the first year. To increase
the adoption rate and the survival rate of acacia trees, the
current support policies could be modified in three ways,
together or separately.
1) On the supply side, a few issues should be considered.
First, payments should be made conditional to success
indicators. A survey of participating farmers showed that about
60% of planted acacia dies due to lack of protection, including
lack of maintenance by the farmer and damages from grazing
by other members of the community. If payments were made
for trees that survive instead of trees planted, many farmers
would likely be inclined to support annual maintenance costs
and prevent these damages. 
Second, the level of payment should be sufficient to make the
practice attractive for farmers. The minimum payment should
equal the difference between the on-site benefits generated
by the land uses before and after conversion. The maximum
payment should not exceed the value of the service provided.
Based on the economic valuation of water services carried out
within this study, the payment should range between TND100
and TND200 per hectare (in present value terms over 20 years,
see Figure 1a). 
Thirdly, the distribution of payment over time should depend
on the difference between the on-site benefits generated by
the two land uses. If the payment in certain years is lower
than this difference, the farmers might be tempted to
abandon the new practice in favour of the old. In our case the
rotation period for acacia is 15 years, and a payment made
every five years might be more successful than a one-time
payment, if made conditional to the survival rate of the
planted trees. This would imply planting a third of the total
area with acacia every five years, rather than planting the
total area in the first year. 
2) On the demand side, the funding could be made more
dependent on payments from water users, rather than
exclusively from the government. Obtaining funding directly
from water users (drinking water systems and irrigated areas)
would increase the budget available for conservation, and it
would contribute to more efficient use of water. For example,
the economic analysis over 20 years shows that converting one
hectare of cereals into cereals with conservation measures
results in a benefit of reduced sedimentation of TND200/ha
to water users.5 It would also reduce the farmer’s benefit by
about TND100/ha.6 As the additional benefits for water users
are greater than the costs to the farmer, there is a potential
to manifest this relationship within a PES scheme, without
government support. The biggest challenge to this approach is
convincing water users to pay for the services that they are
receiving. In a context where water users are used to receiving
these services for free – most of the time being paid by the
government – they have little incentive to pay for
conservation, even though they are the main beneficiaries.
3) Secure land tenure. Another approach would be to start
from the institutional side, by strengthening the use rights of
lands in gullies to ensure that the benefits from acacia are not
collectively owned. If benefits from acacia were sufficiently
large to increase the net benefit to the farmer above those of
cereals, no additional PES scheme would be required.7 If
however they are insufficient to motivate farmers to plant and
conserve the trees, the ownership of acacia products would
reduce but not eliminate the need for additional payment. 
Figure 1a. PES scheme to convert cereals to cereals with
acacia in gullies
Figure 1b.4 Additional net benefit caused by cereals with
acacia in gullies
4 In Figure 1b, the negative net benefit is due to the cost of planting acacia (every 15 years) and maintenance costs (safeguarding) every year.
5 This is the difference in the sedimentaion benefits reflected in the green bars of Figure 1a.
6 This is the difference in the on-site benefits reflected in the red bars of Figure 1a.
7 In this case, the estimated net returns from cereals and acacia in gullies presented in Table 1 should be updated to include also the benefits of wood fron acacia.
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Conclusion
Analysis of the benefits of conservation measures indicates
that it would be possible in principle to establish a user-
financed PES mechanism in the Barbara watershed, with
downstream water users paying upstream farmers. As the
government is already financing conservation measures,
however, it would be easier to convert the existing subsidy
programme into government-financed PES – even though
government-financed PES schemes tend to be less efficient
that those that are user-financed (Engel et al. 2008). An
alternative approach could be to establish a more secure use
rights system in gullies that would allow farmers to derive all
the benefits from plantations. 
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